Abstract
The contrast between Croatia's standing in the international system today and its position in January 1992, when it was finally recognised by the member states of the European Community, could not be starker. Two and a half decades ago Croatia won its independence after barely surviving a brutal war that left thousands of its citizens dead, several hundred thousand homeless, and a third of its territory under occupation. Although internationally recognised, its territorial integrity was far from secured.
Moreover, its relations with most European and world powers -partly on account of its pursuit of independence, and partly on account of these powers' policies during the war -were troublingly acrimonious. Twentyfive years ago, Croatia was attempting to ride the wave of international system changes in order to extricate itself from a troublesome regional status quo. Today, in the midst of a new round of tectonic shifts in the international system, Croatia is hardly keen to alter the regional or larger European status quo. It is a country at peace with its neighbours (despite frequent, though comparatively minor, tensions), desperate to maintain the protection it receives through the membership of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU).
Over the course of the same two and a half decades, the United Kingdom (UK) went through a completely opposite transformation of its standing in the international system. At the time of the end of the Cold War, Britain was engaged in a profound debate regarding its foreign policy strategy and the shift in its geopolitical position. The end of the Soviet threat, the reunification of Germany, and the process of deepening of European integration left Britain's political class torn over the redefinition of Britain's international priorities. Was Britain supposed to jump behind the steering wheel of European integration -to be "at the heart of Europe", as the newly installed Prime Minister John Major exclaimed in November 1990 (Smith, G. Although the British political class welcomed these questions with trepidation, a new status quo in Europe -that was highly beneficial to the UK -developed rather quickly. London was at the forefront of shaping new European political and security structures, all the while building on its special relationship with Washington, and maintaining its connections throughout its former Empire (Jović 2007) . Then, however, came Brexit.
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee under Margaret Thatcher
and John Major, Sir Percy Cradock, thought that one of the greatest errors of modern British foreign policy was treating Europe " [not] as if it was truly our future, rather as if it was a threat, or an adversary" (Cradock 1997: 207) . That error, simmering on and under the surface of British politics for five decades, materialised in the summer of 2016 into a de facto capture of the ruling Conservative Party by its Eurosceptic wing and the consequent departure of the UK from the EU after a bitterly fought and extremely divisive referendum campaign. From one of the pillars of European political and economic security, Britain suddenly turned into one of the largest threats to Europe's geopolitical status quo. The role reversal between Britain and Croatia, if one compares their positions toward Europe's present and future, was complete.
Such a clear disparity in the direction and nature of change in the international positions of Croatia and Britain over the past twenty-five years, coupled with Britain's traditionally low interest in Eastern Europe, could lead us to conclude that relations between the two countries during this period were at best inconsequential. The obvious disproportion in their power capabilities may also lead us to conclude that their relations could only have been unidirectional: that is, Croatia could only have been an object of British foreign policy, never a truly independent subject in the interaction between the two countries, no matter the obvious power imbalance. Both of those conclusions, however, would be incorrect.
The story of relations between Croatia and Britain is by no means a thin volume depicting the powerless simply adjusting to the wishes of the powerful. In the two and a half decades of its independence, Croatia faced many foreign policy challenges: from securing its territorial integrity to establishing functional relations with its neighbours and positioning itself firmly within the political, economic, and security structures of the EU and NATO. Arguably no other country outside of Southeast Europe (SEE) created more obstacles for Croatia in the completion of those foreign policy challenges than Britain. Considering the extraordinary changes in Europe's political architecture that we are currently witnessing, it is time to take stock of the evolution of the relations between these two countries. This article traces Croatia's relations with the UK from its struggle for independence in the early 1990s until the present day, with particular attention devoted to the one intervening variable without which those relations could not be properly understood: the European Union. The article does that in the hope of better understanding the future of not only relations between these two countries, but also of the European project and the UK's policies toward its continued development.
The "original sin": Britain, Croatia and the breakup of Yugoslavia
Britain's policy toward the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, later labelled by Brendan Simms (2002) as Britain's "unfinest hour", was founded upon two closely related dynamics from the late 1980s: 1) London's devotion to the continuing existence of the Yugoslav federation, and 2) the consequent blind spot for the campaign of Slobodan Milošević's Serbia for control over a recentralized Yugoslavia. The response of the Foreign Office to Ambassador Peter Hall's distressed 1989 and 1990 reports about the harmful consequences of Milošević's campaign was that "they really would much prefer it not to be happening" and that Yugoslavia simply had to remain united (Hall 2005) . This position of the Foreign Office was in no way exceptional. During this period, all Western powers -including (West) Germany which did not deviate from the mainstream until real war began in the summer of 1991 -strongly believed not only that the Yugoslav republics had to stick together, but also that they would politically and economically benefit from steady centralisation. This policy preference essentially implied that the Western powers supported Milošević and not Yugoslavia's northwest republics in the constitutional debates which consumed the federation's political landscape in the years leading up to war. It also matched the West's larger policy preference regarding the preservation of stability in Eastern Europe. As the Foreign Secretary commercial interest, no selfish interest at all. We simply wished that quiet should return" (Hurd 2005 ).
Hurd's image of Britain simply wishing for "quiet" to return to a region in which it had no particular strategic interests is, of course, only one part of the story. The larger and by far the more interesting part was Britain's strong policy activism in pursuit of that "quiet" once real war came to Slovenia and -to a far greater extent -Croatia: Whitehall's rejection of Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence; its equivocation in condemning the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) use of force; its dogged opposition to any form of international military intervention -even in the most benign form of ceasefire monitors; its support for an arms embargo which cemented the vast military supremacy of Serbia and its allies for years to come; its determined efforts to halt the recognition of the Yugoslav republics; its refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Croatia for months after its recognition; and, last but not least, the neo-colonial abuse of historical imagery by a number of its diplomats and foreign policy makers who argued that the Yugoslav conflicts were steeped in the region's "ancient hatreds" (Glaurdić 2011) . Contemporary perceptions of
Croatia among British foreign policy makers and of Britain among their
Croatian counterparts were decisively shaped during those first months of Croatia's struggle for independence -and neither country came out looking good. Croatia, largely due to its president Franjo Tuđman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), was seen in Whitehall as the nationalistrun destroyer of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain was seen in Zagreb not only as the country protective of Milošević's Serbia and hostile to Croatia's independence, but also blind to the plight of a series of Croatian towns and villages falling prey to the onslaught of Belgrade's military machinery.
What could explain the content of Britain's activism during this period?
More than a century ago Lord Salisbury remarked that "the commonest error in politics [is] sticking to the carcasses of dead policies" (Hill 1988: 26). London's decision to stick to the policy of keeping Yugoslavia united even after the troubled federation's descent into mayhem does have some explanatory power, though probably only when it comes to the earlier stages of the war in Croatia. The fact that a different approach was eventually advocated by a recently reunited Germany also did not help. To say that Britain was wary of a new European order dominated by Germany would be an understatement (Glaurdić 2011) . Although London (as well as Paris) to a great extent based its policy toward Yugoslavia on the considerations of larger European developments at the time, this line of argumentation also has its limits. A more useful interpretation may be the one offered by James Gow who saw Britain's "pusillanimous realism" decisively contributing to the Western "triumph of the lack of will" to intervene militarily in the Yugoslav conflicts (Gow 1997: 174-183 ).
According to this view, London (and, to varying levels, other Western capitals) accepted the (im)balance of power on the ground in former Yugoslavia because it did not wish to jeopardise its own post-Cold War "peace dividend" by getting embroiled in a Balkan war.
This argument certainly does have its logical appeal. Nevertheless, it is flawed for several reasons. First, it implicitly suggests that Britain was little more than a troubled observer of what was happening in Yugoslavia when, in fact, it was a highly proactive participant with direct and indirect influence on the decisions of the Yugoslav protagonists. Second, the "lack of will" argument also serves to mask the serious clash of wills among the Western powers to which Britain made a decisive contribution, particularly when it comes to its relations with reunited Germany, but later also with the US under the Clinton administration. This clash of wills was not only centred on the question of military intervention, but was concerned with virtually every aspect of the West's policy -military or diplomatic. And third, the "lack of will" argument fails to reveal the extent to which British policy makers were committed to actively warping the interpretation of what was happening on the ground to build a case for their preferred policies.
In order to dissuade the various members of the international community -as well as many in the British public, press, and politics -who were calling for a forceful intervention against Serbian aggression, the case had to be made not only that the origins of the Yugoslav conflict were "ancient", but also that all parties were equally guilty. Indeed, no one contributed more to the distorting campaign of moral relativism and the equivalence of guilt in Western perceptions of Yugoslav conflicts than British foreign policy makers and diplomats (Conversi 1996) . As the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia and the former foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, succinctly put it, the Yugoslavs were "all impossible people… all as bad as each other, and there are just more Serbs" (Simms 2002: 17) . This was realism alright, but it was realism which was fully aware of its consequences for the situation on the ground, and which found those consequences acceptable. As one British journalist observed at the time of the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995, "Ministers don't say so in public, but the fundamental British view remains that only a strong Serbia can ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans" (ibid.: 12). If there was a carcass of dead policies that London stuck to over the years in the region of former Yugoslavia -then this was it.
The triumph of realism: Britain, Croatia and the Bosnian war The obvious implication was that an uneven killing field was preferable (Almond 1994: 321) .
Western foreign policy makers actively worked to limit their involvement and publicly recast the conflict as an unfortunate but intractable civil war.
In this effort, they were determinedly led by the administration of John Major in London which, together with the administration of François Mitterrand in Paris, took the reins of the Western military and diplomatic effort in BosniaHerzegovina. Britain was, thus, instrumental in framing the UN intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina only in humanitarian terms -first as assistance in opening the Sarajevo airport for flights carrying humanitarian aid, then as protection for UNHCR convoys throughout the country, and finally (and extremely reluctantly) as ceasefire monitors and a quasi-protective force in Bosnia's five "safe areas". Britain also maintained strong influence on the shape of the various peace plans which were negotiated during the war -first through Lord Carrington; then through another former Foreign Secretary, David Owen, who in August 1992 succeeded Carrington as the EU co-chairman of the Conference for the Former Yugoslavia; and finally, through the work of the Contact Group (the UK, the US, France, Russia, Germany). Unsurprisingly, all of these peace plans were based on the deeply flawed principle of ethnic territorialisation which ultimately rewarded land grab through violence and ethnic cleansing (Toal and Dahlman 2011) , and which formed the crux of Britain's policy in BosniaHerzegovina. As Douglas Hogg explained in his 1994 contribution to the Royal United Services Institute Journal, the government of BosniaHerzegovina "have to recognize defeat when it stares them in the face, that land has been seized by force, and that there has to be a degree of acceptance of that fact… The other thing that they must accept is that the military option has to be abandoned". This, he wrote, was a "major objective" of British policy (Hogg 1994: 16) .
The interaction between Britain and Croatia when it comes to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a subject of great controversy -which is perhaps not a great surprise, considering that the policies of both countries during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain extremely controversial as well.
Britain's preference for ethnic territorialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina closely mirrored the preferences of Croatia's president Franjo Tuđman and his proxies in the leadership of the BiH Croats; and the Vance-Owen and the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans of 1993 were arguably territorially favourable to the Croats (Hodge 2008: 412-413) . The perverse incentives of these plans for exclusionary policies by the parties on the ground, as well as the huge influx of Bosniak refugees into Croat-controlled areas in Central Bosnia, however, directly led to the Croat-Bosniak conflict of 1993-1994 which resulted in a near catastrophe for the BiH Croats and Croatia itself. Significant territories were lost to the numerically superior and Bosniak-dominated Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the efforts of British foreign policy makers and diplomats to equalise Croatia's and Serbia's roles in Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified. London also led the calls for sanctions on Croatia (Hodge 2006: 66-67) . Zagreb managed to avoid such a fate by consenting to the US-brokered 1994
Washington Agreement which led to the formation of a Bosniak-Croat federation, but Britain's policy saw little change in the last year and a half of the Bosnian war. Its foreign policy makers succeeded in suppressing mounting calls for international intervention, and its diplomats were instrumental in making sure that the Contact Group's peace plan, as well as the Dayton Agreement which finally ended the war awarded 49% of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Serbs (ibid.: 106-126). Even after it became clear that the fall of Srebrenica was followed by a genocidal massacre of thousands of Bosniak men and boys, and that a similar fate likely awaited the "safe area" of Bihać which was surrounded and under heavy attack, Britain was adamant there would be no international action to prevent that from happening (Freedland 1995) .
The "new original sin": Operation Storm and the end of the Croatian war Bihać, however, avoided Srebrenica's fate, largely thanks to Croatia's forces whose Operation Storm in August 1995 not only succeeded in ending the blockade of this "safe area", but also in regaining nearly all of Croatia's previously occupied territory by defeating the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina". Operation Storm was a militarily successful fourday campaign which practically ended the war in Croatia and caused a complete shift of balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina that directly led to the end of the war there as well. The exodus of 150,000-200,000 Krajina Serbs, and the crimes of looting, arson, and murder of several hundred civilians who remained, also, however, sullied Croatia's international image and proved an enormous political and economic burden for years to come.
Britain's response to Operation Storm was extremely negative even before the crimes -which took place over the course of several weeks of lawless interregnum after the operation -became public. The reaction of Defence Secretary Michael Portillo on 7 August 1995 -the last day of the operation -was a perfect case in point. He labelled Operation Storm "ethnic cleansing" and expressed the view that "a conclusion which is based on shifting hundreds of thousands of people and in the process killing tens of thousands more is just not an acceptable way of moving towards a peace settlement." Aside from grossly inflating the numbers of victims, Portillo also shed a revealing light on Britain's view of Croatia's internationally recognized borders: "The difficulty with this conflict has always been to try and get more than one party to agree that it is in their interests to negotiate a peace rather than just to seize more and more territory." His opinion on the aims of the international community was no less illuminating: "The object of international efforts must be to bring the parties to the negotiating table, to establish a map, to establish a ceasefire and then allow the UN to police that ceasefire and continue its humanitarian work" (Wintour 1995) . Croatia was chastised for allegedly "killing tens of thousands" of people and trying "to seize more and more territory".
Meanwhile, the preferred actions of the international community were in fact supposed to reinforce exactly such behaviour because Croatia's shape on the map -despite its internationally recognised borders -was apparently still to be established. Tuđman was cooperative at Dayton and accepted the agreement's principal tenets without much fuss. Soon after the Accords were signed, however, he realised that his strategic goals were not going to be fulfilled on the ground. Rather than a loosely organised collection of ethnically defined cantons with significant self-rule that Tuđman believed it to be, the Bosniak-Croat Federation was to become an entity with strong central prerogatives and thus inevitably dominated by the numerically superior Bosniak community. This led to a serious conflict between the BiH Croats and Tuđman on one side, and the international mediators in BosniaHerzegovina on the other -conflict which ensued, with varying levels of intensity, throughout the rest of Tuđman's presidency.
The principal arena of conflict was the city of Mostar, split during the Bosniak-Croat conflict into two ethnically defined halves. The Dayton Agreement gave a new impetus to the EU efforts of unifying the city, but the local Croats strongly objected to a series of provisions for administrative reorganisation, joint policing, return of refugees, and freedom of movement between the two parts. Tuđman and his government supported their obstinacy, but with serious repercussions for Croatia's international position. As one EU diplomat told the Guardian in January 1996, "At one time Tuđman had friends in high places in some member states. There was talk of Croatia eventually joining the EU. That is completely out of the question now" (Palmer 1996) . Throughout the first half of 1996, Tuđman remained dismissive of the EU's Mostar efforts, but by early August of that year he had to relent. What seemed to seal the deal was the US insistence that, if the Bosniak-Croat Federation was to fall apart because of Tuđman, Croatia was to become an international pariah, as well as calls by UK officials in London and Mostar for possible economic sanctions on Croatia (Barber 1996; Borger 1996) . Europe unless we matter in Europe" (Smith, J. 2005: 708) . And one way of mattering in Europe was pushing forward a real agenda for enlargement.
Crucially, this agenda for enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was to be based on the principle of individual evaluation of each candidate country's own merits. Britain was against the across-the-board beginning of negotiations with all CEE prospective candidates and strongly believed in bilateralism as the guiding principle in relations between the EU and the CEE states (Lippert 2001: 11) . This raised Croatia's expectations of London's support because of Zagreb's extreme irritation with the EU's Regional Approach policy toward Southeast Europe which bundled Croatia together with FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), BosniaHerzegovina, Macedonia and Albania, and which was introduced in 1996.
The implication of this policy was that the EU was in Southeast Europe making regional cooperation into an element of its conditionality for future membership (Bechev 2006: 31 ). Tuđman's reaction to such a policy was obviously very negative. He opposed it partly on pragmatic grounds that the rest of the region -far less economically developed -was to hold Croatia back on its road to the EU. Even more so, he opposed it on political (or even ideological) grounds because he saw the EU Regional Approach as an attempt to rebuild some form of a regional superstructure akin to former Yugoslavia. To Tuđman's disappointment, the new British government not only rebuffed his request for support of Croatia's closer integration with the EU, but it also -in contrast to its policy toward CEE -backed the EU Regional Approach for Southeast Europe. Pact's Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach famously labeled it as "the fast track to full EU membership" (Bechev 2006: 35) . And Romania and Bulgaria -whose EU accession process had stalled until their cooperation helped NATO in its intervention against Belgrade -received a pledge from Tony Blair: "You stood by us, we'll stand by you" (Binyon 1999 ).
More importantly, the EU abandoned its Regional Approach in favour of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which was supposed to deepen contractual relations with individual SEE states based on EU criteria of democratisation and market reform (Bechev 2006: 35) . In one of his last public speeches before passing away, at the summit launching When it came to enlargement, there was firm political consensus on the need for its real progress among all major UK parties. For Tony Blair, Britain supported enlargement because it was not only stabilising the whole continent, but also crucial in turning the EU into a global "superpower, but not a superstate" (Blair 2000) . And for the Shadow Foreign Secretary Francis Maude, enlargement was Britain's "moral imperative" (Crowson 2007: 104) . Once Slobodan Milošević was ousted from power in early issue "has taken over the relationship with Great Britain," Račan told the media before leaving for London. "Croatia cannot be punished because it should have done something that it has not been able to do" (Traynor 2003 ). Blair, however, gave him little more than a polite hearing. As Denis MacShane, his minister for Europe, said at the time, Croatia's "road to Brussels leads through The Hague" (Castle 2003) . Several weeks later, Račan lost the election to the reformed HDZ under the leadership of Ivo Sanader, partly due to his government's policy toward the ICTY. (Traynor 2004) . In a repeat of the clash regarding Croatia's recognition in 1991, the conflict was once again primarily between Britain and Germany. But by March 2005, things changed dramatically. The full nature of the MI6 operation in Croatia was exposed by the media and one of the surveillance vans its agents were using was burned, probably by their local detractors. As a result, Del Ponte's rhetoric turned strongly negative and she reported to the European Council that Croatia was actually shielding Gotovina. On the eve of Croatia's start of accession negotiations, its foreign minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović travelled to London with evidence of her government's efforts to locate Gotovina and to curb the activities of his local associates, but her British interlocutors were unconvinced (Traynor 2005a) . London managed to persuade enough of its partners on the European Council that Croatia's accession negotiations should be postponed. The British government even advised Croatia to suspend its membership application, supposedly to avoid the humiliation of postponement, and to resubmit it once there was progress on the Gotovina front.
Croatia rejected this advice and six months later the issue of its accession negotiations was once again on the agenda of the European Council.
Britain favoured further delay of Croatia's negotiations, but its problem was that it also wanted the Council to approve the start of negotiations with Turkey. The Council was in a heated debate for several days with the dividing lines on the status of both countries nearly perfectly overlapped -Britain, for example, being the strongest opponent of Croatia and proponent of Turkey, and Austria being the strongest proponent of Croatia and opponent of Turkey. In a last-minute compromise, however, to many other countries, including Argentina, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Italy, Russia, Mauritius, and Tahiti (Guardian 2005) . "Those who believed us when we were saying that Gotovina was not in Croatia today received the final and complete confirmation," Croatia's Prime Minister Ivo Sanader told the media, while welcoming the arrest (Browne 2005b ).
Neither Carla Del Ponte nor the British government addressed the issue of Gotovina's actual whereabouts during his escape.
Why did Britain pursue Gotovina so vigilantly and why did it place such extraordinary pressure on Croatia, brazenly infringing on its sovereignty by insisting that it allow a foreign intelligence service to operate freely within its borders? According to various press reports, it is possible that the British intelligence service took the Gotovina case personally due to his alleged connections with the IRA and its attack on the MI6 headquarters in 2000 (Rufford and Walker 2004) . For some British officials, like the former minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, the whole affair also seems to have been personal. In his part-memoir, part-diary, part-policy booklet published in 2011, MacShane exposed a rather undiplomatic distaste for both Gotovina and the late President Tuđman: Tuđman was a "latter-day mini-Mussolini", whereas Gotovina was a "thug" and a "war criminal" who had supposedly "awarded himself the rank of 'General' in Tuđman's war of ethnic cleansing in Croatia" (MacShane 2011: 27, 71, 82) . After Gotovina's first-degree verdict of guilty in April 2011, MacShane took an unprecedented step and wrote a statement for the Croatian media in which he compared Gotovina both to the Nazis and to Stalin's executioners at Katyn (Trkanjec and Muhar 2011) . In November 2012, after Gotovina's appeal was successful and he was found not guilty, the former British minister remained silent.
Personal animosities aside, however, it is undeniable that the Gotovina All member states have to agree to all decisions related to enlargement.
Croatia knows all too well the numerous obstacles that could present themselves in each individual case. Croatia stands firmly on the position that all states which wish to become members must go through a detailed, all-encompassing, carefully thought out, and just process of negotiations" (Veljković 2013) . As sympathetic as the Croats may have been for the cause of independent Scotland, their government did not wish to rock neither the UK nor the EU boat.
Referendum fever in the UK, however, soon continued with the Brexit campaign. It would be generous to say that the short-lived coalition government of Tihomir Orešković had any real position toward the two possible outcomes of the Brexit referendum. How could it have had, considering how divided and weak it was, and considering how little its opinion would have mattered to both the UK voters and the remaining EU partners? It greeted the shocking referendum result with regret, labelling it as the "greatest strike against the unity of Europe from the very beginning of its integration, and for us a particularly sensitive issue at a time when enlargement to our neighbouring nations is worked on" (Vlada 2016a).
Prime Minister Orešković's statements were a bit more revealing. Orešković Cameron's strategic error of succumbing to the populists and calling for an "unnecessary" referendum which turned a crisis within his own party into a crisis of national, European, and global significance (Hina 2016 ).
Plenković's statements were particularly interesting since he was already in campaign mode for the leadership of his own party. He was signalling a clear break with his more nationalist predecessor who found role-models in Orbán's Hungary or Kaczyński's Poland.
Indeed, as Plenković stated to the Croatian Television in response to a question regarding whether Croatia should get closer to the Visegrád Group in post-Brexit EU, "I believe we must be strongly pro-European because that is a project which will last despite the current crisis. If we give way to the forces that wish to water it down, I think that will make the whole continent much less relevant globally, and that would be a step back for us in terms of both economic performance and values" (HRT 2016). For Plenković and his government sworn in on 16 October 2016, Brexit could easily become Britain's new "original sin" if it jeopardizes the future of the EU. In that they probably differ little from a whole generation of pro-EU politicians on the continent. Whether Brexit does jeopardise the future of the EU, however, is still anybody's guess. UK Prime Minister Theresa May in her 17 January 2017 speech announcing her government's plans for hard Brexit wanted to assuage Europe's fears: "The decision to leave the EU represents no desire to become more distant to you, our friends and neighbors. It was no attempt to do harm to the EU itself or to any of its remaining member states" (Independent 2017). Brexit negotiations will, however, present the real test of this claim, as will Britain's relations with the Trump administration in Washington whose commitment to European integration is suspect at best. These issues will determine the near future of Britain's relations not only with Croatia, but also with the rest of the EU.
Conclusions
Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia's relations with Britain were undoubtedly its greatest foreign policy challenge since independence.
Despite their clear power disparity, however, relations between the two countries were not driven by Britain's preferences and Croatia's adaptation to them -on the contrary. Croatia pushed for and achieved independence -against Britain's wishes. It secured its territorial integrity and ultimate victory in the war for independence -against Britain's wishes. It successfully navigated through the Scylla and Charybdis of EU negotiations and became a full member state before the rest of the region -also against Britain's wishes. A relatively small European state defied one of the greatest European powers and managed to achieve virtually all of its foreign policy aims. This is a cautionary tale for many scholars of international relations and EU politics committed to theoretical approaches which privilege state power capabilities over all other factors. Small states are not simply the objects of great power politics, but can shape their own and their regions' destinies independently. However, how do we explain Britain's policy activism when it comes to Croatia and its region? Why did a small and seemingly inconsequential country in Southeast Europe generate such interest and policy commitment from one of Europe's great powers?
Judging by Ambassador Blunt's candid comment regarding his superiors in Whitehall, perhaps the root of it all was in historical oversimplification -one error British policy makers have a strong tendency to make (Hill 1988: 24) . Foreign Office, for example, in its online profile for Croatia until Foreign Office's historically inaccurate view of the breakup of Yugoslavia is, however, more important for another reason. It reveals that Whitehall still lays the bulk of blame for Yugoslavia's dissolution on the federation's northwestern republics and not on Serbia. In the eyes of London, the breakup of Yugoslavia -the starting point for the two countries' discordant relations -was Croatia's "original sin". This is not to say that Britain's policy toward Croatia over the past two decades has been some sort of vendetta for the demise of what British diplomats were in 1991 calling "our baby" (Glaurdić 2011: 374 ). London's actions were obviously guided by the events on the ground, Croatia's own democratic deficit, the limitations of diplomacy in a multilateral environment, the perception of British interests in the region, and by the general reluctance of the UK public to support EU enlargement.
In a national survey conducted on the eve of Croatia's EU accession, for example, only 10% of UK respondents stated they wished to see Croatia join the EU, with overwhelming majorities opposing further enlargement on account of its supposed negative effect on unemployment, immigration, terrorism, and EU decision making (YouGov 2012). Britain's actions toward Croatia were also, however, embedded in a particular kind of "historical thinking" about Southeast Europe and in a long tradition of thought about British policy in this region. British historical biases regarding Croatia were likely reinforced with that realist conception that "only a strong Serbia can ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans."
These factors were important determinants of Britain's relations with Croatia until Croatia's entry into the EU. Recent events, however, have profoundly altered the game, making it difficult to predict how the relations between the two countries will develop in the years to come.
Ironically, the failures of EU policies -to a significant extent crafted by Britain -during the Yugoslav wars, and Britain's use of the EU accession process as a tool of pressure on Croatia, have made the Croatian public and political elite less Europhile and more Atlanticist, which would have meant that Zagreb and London could have become true allies within the EU on a number of crucial policy fronts -from the Union's relations with the United States to the EU eastward enlargement or even the process of deepening of economic integration.
Rather than future collaboration on the pace of EU reforms or enlargement in Southeast Europe, however, they will now be preoccupied with questions of Britain's exit from the EU. Croatia is unlikely to have great influence on that negotiating process, although consensus within the EU will be needed.
Croatia, and all other remaining EU member states, will however shape their relations with the UK based on the evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of future EU integration. Prime Minister May was eager to reassure its EU partners that Britain will remain a friend of the European Union and a pillar of European security. It remains to be seen whether those words will translate into actual policy, or if London will be swayed toward who knows what kind of destabilising policy coming from Washington and/or Moscow in the near future. In other words, challenges to Europe's geopolitical status quo might once again be the principal bone of contention between Croatia and Britain, though this time with one crucial difference: Croatia will be in, and Britain out.
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